The Governance of Homelessness in European Metropolises, Governing Quality?

A PhD literature review on governance arrangements and their outcomes in reality

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Summary

The policy challenges that local authorities face in dealing with homelessness are complex or even wicked (Rittel & Weber, 1973) and local authorities haven’t always been too successful in addressing homelessness, with a lack of information to base policy on (Fleurke e.a., 2002), highly fragmented services (Wolf, 2002), congested shelters (Ibo, 2003) and the institutionalization of homeless (Lindblom, 1991) as its main characteristics. More recently northern European Metropolises, in facing comparable policy challenges, have published strategic approaches to end homelessness (Cf: Benjaminsen e.a 2009).

This paper concerns a literature review to prepare an empirical study of the impact of metropolises’ governance arrangements on the quality of service provision (output) and outcome (e.g. in public space and on the level of self-sufficiency of homeless people themselves). Elements of governance revealed from the study are elements of policy (theory, goals and instruments), structure (multi-level and relation state, civil society and network design) and management.

Governance, Homelessness Strategy, Northern European Metropolises

1. Introduction: the problem of homelessness

Homelessness, nowadays, is merely a local responsibility. The policy challenges that a local authority faces in dealing with this issue are complex. Multiple causes can lead to homelessness, however the outcome of these causes are the same. A moral undesirable situation of a person rendered without the sufficient care, wandering the streets which also poses questions on the local domain of public order. Since the heroine epidemic of the eighties of the last century (Buster, 2003) the amount of homeless has dramatically increased. In addition the de-institutionalization of the mental health sector (cf. Verplanke en Duyvendak, 2009) might have caused an increase of the amount and the problematic that homeless people deal with. Homelessness is a topic that has the attention of the public and the media (The Big Issue, Dutch T.V. shows such as filthy rich and homeless, that has been constructed as a social problem as such by scientists (Deben en Greshof, 1998) and is a politically sensitive issue. In the Netherlands, on a local level, responsibilities for policy interventions for vulnerable people have been diagnosed to be highly fragmented (cf. Wolf, 2002) and local authorities’ relation to information to base their policy on tends to be weak (Fleurke et al, 2002). On a central state level it was felt that local authorities needed to achieve that adjacent facilities and sectors over whom they don’t have a say, take their responsibility. At that time (2003) it was concluded for Dutch municipalities that they succeed insufficient in fulfilling this role. For a closed chain of social relief the cooperation of services such as mental health, child protection, social housing, healthcare, income support, probation and addiction policy would be required (IBO, 2003).
What have similar local authorities done to address comparable issues? The main policy goal on homelessness traditionally has been to reduce the number of homeless persons sleeping rough and therefore to expand services (cf. Van Doorn et al., 2002). In the Netherlands, this policy led to half of the homeless population to be housed in shelters, whom live their life there permanently (Nuy, 1998; IBO, 2003). And whilst deinstitutionalization is said to be contributing to homelessness (Verplancke en Duyvendak, 2009), it is the institutionalization of homeless (Lindblom, 1991) that in its turn inevitably increases the risk of hospitalization (Goffman, 1961), which significantly hinders the options for individuals to ever live independent again. It is this lack of perspective and positive outflow and rehabilitation options that causes the sector of social relief to have been referred to as ‘congested’ (IBO, 2003). Besides the individual and moral questions that this issue possess, a lack of focus of homeless services on prevention and the provision of support, targeted at stabilization of the housing situation raises policy questions regarding the effectiveness and the efficiency of the system (Culhane, 2011).

For the case of homelessness policy it is relevant and justified to refer to the concept of wicked problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Wicked problems is a phrase used to describe a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize. Moreover, because of complex interdependencies, the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may reveal or create other problems. The policy has become part of the social problem and might even have become the reason for the problem to exist or persist (cf. Beck, 1992 in Arentsen & Trommel, 2005).

Therefore, the complexity of a certain policy area demands a certain level of expertise and knowledge necessary for the execution of a policy. Policies that require a high degree of specialist knowledge can score negative in regard to the efficiency of program spending (Fleurke et al., 1997). Trommel (2010) warns that an overambitious authority that faces complex issues involves a risk of being too greedy, whilst it doesn’t find the time nor the resources anymore to execute its classic regulative and controlling tasks.

**Lost in wickedness, the Dutch case**

The entitlement of homelessness as a wicked problem is helpful in identifying a set of policy risks. One policy risk is the possible greediness of governments and the lack of the required level of expertise that might lead to higher expenditures. The greediness-risk might have been recognized by Schout (2011) whom feels that Dutch municipalities have mostly succeeded in the development of the expansion of a (permanent) last resort safety net, which then involves the risk of only having added to the shelter congestion and the permanent dependency of individuals. While Public Mental Health was intended to be a temporary provision, unnoticed this becomes a growing institution that stands in the way of the resilience of other actors. According to Schout knowledge needs to be gained on how Public Mental Health can decrease or even become unnecessary, instead of the unbridled expansion of it. In the Netherlands, the policy to house homeless, in institutions, has caused a new policy problem of hospitalization & institutionalization causing or strongly influencing the social problem of residential homelessness (cf. IBO, 2003; State/ G4, 2011).

### 2. The governance perspective

Governance is a popular term since the late 1990s. Many different meanings of the term exist. In this paper when I write about governance I mean public governance that refers to relations between the state and the civil society. In this form of governance it is useful to differentiate between three elements; Policy (Beck, 1992; Arentsen en Trommel; 2005; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2008), Structure (Van Montfort, 2008; Boutellier, 2011; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Peters and Painter, 2010) and Management (Weber, 1952; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Frederickson, 1999b). I will illustrate these elements, by characteristics of the governance of homelessness.

The main idea is that various governance arrangements exist, that are comprised from the most appropriate variations of the elements, to that particular context. Pollit and Bouckaert (2011) refer to this approach as paradigms and plates with the metaphor of menu that are consisting of the dishes that fit together well.
2.1. Where content matters: Policy

Policy refers to the attempt that is made to serve one or more public interests. The wickedness of a specific problem is usually referred to as the complexity of the policy element. Helpful tools to study a policy and its coherence can be to focus on the policy’s normative and empirical (or causal) assumptions as a starting point, then to study the goals set in the policy and finally the tools intended to be employed, according to the policy. By whom and how successful these tools and therefore the policy will be in meeting its goals, is related to the governance structure and model of process management, discussed in the second and third subheading.

2.1.1. Basic assumptions: the policy model

The whole of assumptions on which a policy is based, is referred to as the policy model (Dunn, 2012). These are assumptions about the traits and the causes of the problem that the policy is targeted at (Hoogerwerf, 1984) containing normative, causal and final assumptions.

2.1.1.1. Normative assumption: coercion and compulsion as an example

Normative assumptions refer to important values and norms that lead to a preference for certain goals or the acceptance or rejection of certain instruments (Van Heffen in Hoogerwerf and Herweijer, 2008).

As an example of a possible difference in basic normative assumptions underlying homeless policy, I take the usage of coercion and compulsive measures. Especially in homelessness provisions coerciveness can be a sensitive issue, since persons might be refusing care due to earlier negative experiences with predominantly mental health services. When visiting a specific homelessness provision in Copenhagen, named Skaeve Huse, I understood that people are left free to use their own provision, or not. Even if a person chooses not to use his Huse during summer, the Huse will not be given to another homeless person. Also I noticed a large amount of people sleeping rough in this city, even though the level of provisions and budgets is comparable to spending in large Dutch cities. This phenomenon might be explained by a lack of coercion and compulsion by the City of Copenhagen, as opposed to the City of Amsterdam. In Amsterdam persons sleeping rough will be fined and/or be taken to a night shelter or if this is not available a police cell.

I would argue that in this case these assumptions are rather not empirically tested, but based on (implicit) normative frameworks. In this case the underlying moral framework in the city of Copenhagen might be one about liberties and the permanent availability and continuity of care, meeting the individual demand. The normative framework applied in the case of Amsterdam would be that it is not a good thing to sleep rough, and a person (eligible to care) would need protection from doing so.

2.1.1.2. Empirical assumptions: housing first or staircase model as an example

Causal assumptions refer to perceptions of a causal relation between A and B. Final assumptions refer to the assumed relation between the instruments and the attained goals. A combination of causal and final relations constructs empirical relations (Hoogerwerf and Herwijer, 2008).

I would like to illustrate the strength of empirical assumptions as a decisive factor in policy making by the development of the housing first- and the staircase model. As mentioned before, policy goals on homelessness traditionally have been to reduce the number of homeless persons sleeping rough, by expanding institutionalized services. At the time research showed that persons housed independent again, where most likely to experience a relapse into homelessness (Jencks, 1994; Van Doorn, 2002).

When more research became available on improved successful methodologies (such as ACT) and ambulatory provisions successfully housing persons formerly sleeping rough and refusing care, new causal assumptions could be constructed. Two dominant paradigms, differences in philosophy, or causal assumptions, underlying the content of the policies now coexist. In the staircase model the assumption is that a homeless person needs to be trained to become housing ready again (Feantsa/
SEV, 2005). In the housing first approach a person is housed first and is trained on the spot in overcoming possible barriers in remaining housed (Tsemberis and Eisenberg, 2000). The staircase model is still predominantly seen in the Netherlands and Sweden, while the housing first model is currently utilized in a fairly elastic manner in most of the remaining liberal and social democratic regimes (Benjaminsen et al, 2009). At the same time experimentation also takes place in the Netherlands and Sweden (cf. Busch-Geertsema, 2010; Maas, 2012).

### A negative consequence of the policy content. The Swedish case

Benjaminsen and Dyb (2008) discuss how differences in housing policies and in social policies can be observed among the Nordic countries. Benjaminsen and Dyb compare the patterns of homelessness among the Scandinavian countries, explaining their findings in terms of variations in national strategies, housing and social policies and underlying intervention models. They argue that the small, but significantly higher, rates of homelessness in medium sized Swedish cities, compared with Danish and Norwegian cities, is a consequence of the more widespread use of the staircase model and the secondary housing market in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway, which to a larger extent follow a housing first approach.

What I think is important in this example, is that in obtaining information and experience with both models, or in being able to test these empirical assumptions, the nature of direct relations with provisions or indirect through the policy network (a matter of structure) might be relevant. Hoogerwerf and Herweijer (2008) advise that when service providers do not share the same normative assumptions (as the state), more persuasions will be needed for them to implement the policy. They warn that this makes an administrative implementation less likely to succeed, and the implementation will be tendering to a political or symbolic form. In this case debate, persuasion and forming coalitions will be needed. Also, when there exists a lot of insecurity on the empirical assumptions, a flexible policy is needed.

#### 2.1.2. Policy goals: considerable convergence

The choice of a policy goal depends on the normative, causal and final assumptions, mentioned before. A goal will only be targeted at a subject that is thought to be possibly influenced by policy (instruments). This desired outcome will also vary depending on the values and norms and the knowledge of the person setting the goals. As we have seen for the goal to offer homeless a caring roof, when both information on the risks of hospitalization and knowledge on alternative forms of housing increased, the goal has changed to housing homeless persons as independent as possible.

Even though we have seen differences in the basic assumptions that may underlie policies, this doesn’t seem to be expressed in the policy goals that are set in different northern European contexts. Benjaminsen et al (2009) found that in recent years all European nation states with liberal and social democratic welfare regimes outline a set of strategic objectives that aim to, in many cases, eliminate homelessness. A clear emphasis on outcomes such as reducing the use of temporary accommodation, reducing stays in shelters, providing long-term or permanent accommodation and offering individualized services and support are present in all the reviewed strategies. In most of the strategies there is also a clear focus on prevention, especially the English, Norwegian and Swedish, mainly in their emphasis on reducing the number of evictions. The principal objectives of the Dutch Strategy Plan are currently targeted at prevention and rehabilitation (State/ G4, 2011).

When the differences in the basic assumptions are not that clearly expressed in the policy goals that are set, maybe a difference is visible in the instruments employed to achieve these goals.

#### 2.1.3. Policy-instruments, reflecting the basic assumptions

Policy instruments are methods used by governments to achieve a desired effect. Coolsma (2008) assumes a relation between the basic assumptions of the policy model and the chosen policy instruments. Fenger en Kok (2008) distinguish between different types of policy-instruments, such as information transfer (the sermon), financial incentives (the carrot), regulations (the stick) and physical instruments. In studying the instruments something can possibly be said about the underlying policy model, but also about the preferred management style (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) and the relation between the state and the civil society. For example, one can distinguish between policy instruments
that can be either intrusive into the work processes of subsidized organizations and prescriptive, or more distant and general.

The nature of policy instruments can also be influenced by (and influence) the monitoring and surveillance systems that are in place for accountability purposes whilst conceptions of accountability can differ significantly (Cf. Day and Klein, 1987 in Painter and Peters, 2010).

In support of the implementation of the Dutch G4 Strategy Plan, several instruments were designed. For example:

- A model agreement on data exchange in connection with privacy legislation (to support coordination);
- An instrument containing the starting points for the realization of long-term accommodation for homeless who suffer long-term drug addiction and serious psychiatric disturbance, using coercive measures on individual clients;
- A model Application and Diagnosis Form (on how to apply for integrated diagnoses and means, also the number of ADF was important for accountability to the central state);
- A model procedure for a person-orientated approach (on how to work with clients in an integrated manner); later on other methodologies to work with homeless people such as Assertive Community Treatment and Critical Time Intervention are developed.

These instruments are rather specific and detailed and could be experienced as either supportive or intrusive in the work process of services providers. The examples of ACT and CTI can be a policy instrument to a central state in working with its local authorities in one context (Denmark), while this is left up to professionals in a semi-market situation in another city (possibly stimulated by the authorities with financial incentives, which is the case in the Netherlands or partly by private funds such as is the case in the UK);

Other examples of policy instruments in the different contexts are

- joint purchasing of homelessness provisions with for example the national health insurance (financial incentive or regulative) in the Netherlands;
- targeted subsidizing of (temporary) accommodation (financial instrument) in the UK and the Netherlands;
- applying a statutory definition of homelessness (to define the threshold for eligibility for homelessness services, based on empirical assumptions about the self-sufficient capacity of homeless people (in the Netherlands1) and/ or intentionality (in the United Kingdom) (regulative instrument)
- information on the municipality’s policy such as visible on www.amsterdambiedtonderdak.nl (instrument of information transfer);
- Influencing the policy network (instrument of information transfer) (Fenger and Kok, 2008), applicable to all contexts mentioned here.

A focus on general housing policies and a rights based approach in terms of the statutory definition of homelessness is found to be predominant in the liberal regimes, whereas a focus on the most marginal groups and extending social services and interventions for these groups is most characteristic of the strategies in the social democratic regimes (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). In Coolsma’s concept the inclusiveness of rules would be explained by the normative and empirical assumptions of the policy. Studying instruments seems helpful in revealing governance elements that would otherwise remain implicit. In the section on the quality of provisions I will argue how in measuring output this can most successfully be related back to the specific policy instruments targeted at these outputs.

### 2.2. Structure

The term governance also tends to relate to a difference between a central level government where all power and responsibilities are allocated, and the case in which these are organized both central and decentralised and in cooperation with non-governmental organizations as well. As elements of structure I will discuss intergovernmental relations or multi-level governance (e.g. at what

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1 See for example 10-05-2011Gemeenteblad van Utrecht 2011, nr. 29) and Lauriks et al (2010)
administrative level(s) finances and decisions are allocated (cf. Fleurke and Hulst, 2006), the division of tasks between the government, market and the third sector (civil or societal society) and network design (e.g. what key-players are involved in networks).

2.2.1. Multi-level governance

In the Netherlands the placement of responsibilities for vulnerable people to a local level was part and parcel of a larger decentralization trend that took part from the eighties in the former century. The assumed effect of decentralization of responsibilities and means to a local level was that this would lead to integrated approaches, efficiency, customized services and an increase of democracy. Nowadays, a general approach of the importance of local government responsibility is emphasized in all countries. The general approach was meant to cover practically all policy areas, implemented by a series of general measures (Fleurke en Hulst, 2006).

At the same time, the era of reconstruction after the Second World War and the following rise of the Welfare State have shown what is known as a process of sneaky centralization. In a piecemeal way central government invaded the domain of local government. Demands from a great variety of social groups gave rise to national legislation to guarantee a wide range of public services for all citizens. Local government became an important provider of public services. Dutch local government underwent a development in this, similar to local government in other countries of Northern Europe (Page and Goldsmith, 1987: 156-157 in Fleurke en Hulst, 2006). This resulted, in many cases in the social domain, in responsibilities having not entirely but only partly been decentralized to several administrative levels. Now multi-level governance is often the case.

Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest (2010) assume it to be commonly accepted in organization theory, that specialization results in efficiency gains. Following this logic major monolithic organizations have been dismantled into smaller parts, each granted a level of autonomy. As well as an increase of decentralization and devolution, a clear expansion of the number of autonomous agencies has been visible in the public sector. This resulted in a fragmentation of public organizations which was perceived as proliferation getting out of control. This movement was combined with two other traditional shifts in the public sector. First, there was the split between politics and administration, and second, there is the split between policy design and implementation. The nature of the relationship between administration and political institutions can be distinct or close. Painter and Peters (2010) that an important question is whether technical (merit) or political criteria dominate in administration. I think that the difference between empirical and normative assumptions mentioned before can have a place in the answer to this question. A focus on checks and balances, redefining responsibilities and accountabilities for different functions, has encouraged experimentation with a policy cycle split. Design is in one organization, and implementation could be in another, private or public. This split may disable policy design to take into accounts the strengths and weaknesses of implementation (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010).

Benjaminsen (et al, 2009) found that in liberal regimes there is limited room for the local authorities to make their own local plans, in contrast to the Nordic welfare states where local authorities hold far-reaching autonomy and extensive responsibilities, resulting in the strategy documents from the liberal contexts being extremely detailed.

What is known so far on the basis of research, tempers all too high expectations of the effects of decentralization. And this caution is especially relevant for the assumedly improved steering of the social domain. For the case of homelessness this implies that in decision making processes as well as different municipal services and boroughs, national health insurance, counties and several departments in the central state are involved (Care, Housing, Justice department). This may explain for the fragmentation in homelessness provisions as diagnosed by Wolf (2002).
2.2.2. The state, market and civil society

On the social domain in many instances not only the authorities are into play. One can think of churches as the example of a private initiative. Traditionally in the Netherlands and England the execution of the care for vulnerable groups lies with the civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations.

It may be helpful to characterize relationships with society as either quasi-organic or contractual. Within the Anglo Saxon there is a strong contractual element in thinking about state formation. In such a construction the state is a product of an agreement in society for its own governance. This contract is limited and can be abrogated in the case of malfeasance or nonfeasance by the state. The alternative to the contractarian notion is a more organic view, in which state and society are intertwined to the extent that it is almost impossible to separate them. These differences in relationships have an impact on patterns of public administration, for example with respect to accountability mechanisms (Painter and Peters, 2010) and network design. For an authority the creation of, and intervention in, a policy network is often an indirect attempt to get to the policy results. Setting up a network and who is part of this, is an aspect of the policy surroundings that impacts the effectiveness of the policy instruments (De Bruijn, 2008).

2.2.3. Network design

Networks can be big or small, homo- or heterogenic, have strong mutual ties amongst parties, or be a diffuse group. Its dynamics can be characterized as stable in which consensus on the policy problem and its instruments exists, or as a dynamic network in which there is lots of debate and viewpoints can diverge strongly. Local authority can be close with the authority being part of the network or have a large distance from the actual network (Bressers, 1993 in Hoogerwerf en Herwijer, 2008).

Rhodes (1996) identifies it to be a specific trait of networks that they are a challenge to governability because they become autonomous and resist central guidance. A major concern of network steering is identified by Klijn (2008) whom feels that the inherently political nature of governance processes, that are about reconciling different values as well as the different actors representing those values, that involve struggles about the values represented in decision making and policy outcomes, are dissolved or displaced by the management of the process. Boutellier (2010) may put this concern in perspective by reference to the specific moral direction that is in the core task of social institutions such as schools, youth prisons and care providers. Their core tasks being knowledge transfer, moral disciplining and emphatic support, for which these values won’t be lost all to easily. From a narrow perspective of government resistance to central guidance would be problematic, seeing this from a broader governance concept, from a perspective of shared interest and moral direction however, may shed a different light. Studying the outcomes of contemporary governance arrangements is an attempt to increasingly clarify the concerns as mentioned by the first two authors (Rhodes and Klijn).

An interesting theoretical fashion to distinguish between network structures is to separate pluralist, corporatist and corporate pluralist approaches. In pluralism the assumption is that government is relatively little involved with interest groups directly. Rather government establishes the arenas through which the groups work out their own political struggles and establishes a set of rules to the game about how decisions will be made. In this theoretical position no group is considered dominant but all groups have relative equal chances of winning on any issue. Further, groups move in and out relatively easily and largely at their own initiative.

Corporatist models, in contrast, assume a much closer linkage between state and society, and some official sanctioning of interest groups by government. In corporatism particular interest groups are accorded a legitimate role as representatives of their sector of the economy or society. Only a limited number of actors can play the game, and those that do are bound closely with the power of the state. It strengthens the decision making capacity of the state by limiting the number of societal actors which can be involved in making policy. The corporate pluralist model falls somewhere between the other

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2 Peters and Pierre (2000) refer to the essence of the corporatist model of policymaking in the Netherlands, Austria and the Scandinavian countries being the institutionalization of coalitions between the state and key actors in its environment.
two models. Like pluralism, there are a large number of actors involved but like corporatism those actors are given a legitimate status for influencing public policy (Pierre and Peters, 2000). When we combine these insights with the knowledge we just gained in respect to the characterising of the relationship between state and society we can conclude that the Scandinavian countries indicate having a homogenous or corporatist network in a quasi-organic setting. In the Anglo-Saxon context rather there would be heterogeneous or pluralist networks in a more contractual setting.

Benjaminsen and Dyb (2010) found that while the importance of local government responsibility is emphasized in all countries, the role of NGO's varies considerably. Benjaminsen et al. (2009) show how the role of NGO's is emphasized in the strategies in Anglo-Saxon countries, whereas the key players in the Scandinavian countries are mainly the municipalities themselves. In particular the liberal welfare state emphasize the participation of cross-department groups of housing authorities, health authorities, probation services and the NGO sector in implementing the strategy.

Successful involvement of other key-players in the UK
In regard to the effect that certain key-players in a network may or may not have on the policy outcomes Pawson et al (2007) found that it was the engagement in homelessness prevention by mainstream agencies and services systems (as compared to specialized shelter services) that has been identified to be a critical component in the successful English reform (into preventing homelessness).

In its essence, the policy's structure is expected to be there to serve the policy's tasks (its goals) and its accountability mechanisms. In this paragraph we have seen that various and at times conflicting developments can result in a current structure. How well these eventually work out to serve societal outcomes is a relevant question that is posed in this study.

2.3. Influential organizational underpinnings of governance arrangements

Above we see how policies and design of structures make up an important part of the governance arrangement. In the introduction of these concepts and the extent to which these may vary, implicit and explicit reference has already been made to influential theoretical underpinnings of governance structures.

How to solve issues of policy implementation, network design and accountability? In discussing the organizational underpinnings of governance arrangements, I distinguish between perspectives that represent artificial dichotomies that may however be helpful in understanding, recognizing and empirically mapping different positions in practice. Bovens et al. (2007, p.236) make a difference between technical process control and social process control. We can also think of the difference made in the latter paragraph between contractual and quasi-organic relationships (Painter and Peters, 2010). The main element of my approach will consist in the distinction that can be made between New Public Management (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993) and the alternative that can be referred to as post-Weberian organizational New Value Management or institutional theory (Olsen, 2009).

A third dominant strand of thinking introduced by Weber (1952) has been that the public administrator in essence a legal figure, perhaps little different from a judge: the task of the public administrator is to identify the legal foundations of public actions and to implement that law. Legal education then is the foundation for recruitment of public servants. Since law concern the embodiment of public values, this model can be seen to acknowledge considerable room for the inherently normative nature of political decision making.

2.3.1. New Public Management

An emphasis on management is the most marked contrast to this legalistic value-loaded tradition. In this conception the principal administrative task is to make programs function as efficiently and effectively as possible. This management is carried out within a legal framework, but the first question that the administrator will ask is not about the law but about organizing and managing the program. New Public Management (NPM) characterizes a global public management reform movement that has redefined the relationships between government and society. According to this line of thinking, six
core issues are relevant in public management: productivity, marketization, service orientation, decentralization, policy and accountability (Kettl, 2000 in Frederickson and Smith, 2003). NPM is famous for stating that governments should rather steer than row. In Europe, the major model for NPM is said to be practiced by the Westminster model (UK). According to Peter and Pierre (1998 in Frederickson and Smith, 2003) a clear focus on outcomes and steering rather than rowing does not always or only have the desired effect. A focus on outcomes only, would mystify the public values underlying the public administration’s legitimacy. And steering rather than rowing would make a public administrator gain rather less insight into complex issues than more.

What alternative to NPM exists nowadays?

2.3.2. New Value Management

In the alternative approach the interactions among different groups in society with government, or even without direct government involvement, is emphasized. In this view governance is the emergent property of interactions rather than the imposition of control from above. The argument is often extended to imply that any tempts on the part of government to impose its authority will be met with resistance, which would make the government unsuccessful. Original contributions in this line of thinking attempt to tackle the problem of governance in a fragmented (read: multi-level, network) state. The emphasis of administrative conjunction theory is on values, professional interests and has cooperation between institutional actors as its objective. Underlying conjunctions are professional concepts of the public interest and an obligation among public servants to represent an inchoate public outside of a particular jurisdiction. The end result is not just coordination amongst various units of the (disarticulated) state, but the reappearance of the meaningful representation (think of the directing core values of particular institutions, Boutellier) that has leaked steadily from elected offices as jurisdictional borders become less relevant to policy problems (think of the concept of wicked problems, before).

In the context of homelessness strategies reference took place to a clear emphasis on outcomes (Benjaminsen et al, 2009) and to rather steer than row (Benjaminsen and Dyb, 2010). It will be interesting to see how the particular governance arrangements have had their effect.

2.4. Wrapping up insights on governance

In the preceding paragraphs on policy, structure and management we have been able to see how different arrangements can be revealed. Policies are converging and diverging at the same time. Formulated outcomes converge towards prevention and recovery, whilst the policy instruments differ in their targeting of general populations or specific persons which is related to wider availability of welfare provisions and housing. Policy’s underlying models are related to these instruments that governments will use to attain their goals, whilst issues of implementation and setting up a network and who part of this, impact the effectiveness of policy instruments. The level of allocation is subject to an on-going debate and responsibilities currently are situated at multi levels. In networks several parties participate who all serve their own political, financial and ideological agenda as well to the topic that the authority tries to address. Differences can be observed between the state’s contractual or organic relation with society and its pluralistic or corporatist way in dealing with networks. Both pluralist and corporatist manners of dealing with networks seem to know their benefits (e.g. successful prevention) and their challenges (decreased power, compartmentalization). Finally, there seems to be discussion on the actual task that authorities have, to steer or to row. In steering, a focus on outcomes would be promoted, however, rowing allows a focus on public values and interaction from which actual implementation might benefit. Now let have a closer look at what exactly can be constructed as quality, in this context, before presenting upon a model to describe and possibly measure the effectiveness of different arrangements.
3. Governing Quality? Providing the basic conceptual model

3.1. Quality of provisions as output

This paragraph will discuss how to conceptualize the quality of provisions as well as how this can be seen as the output of governance arrangements in the context of this study. The aims of quality can be described as (1) to monitor and evaluate costs, quality, and access of homeless services in a rapidly changing system of care; (2) to ensure accountability; (3) to evaluate the progress of homeless services in meeting the strategic goals and objectives in relation to costs (cf. HRSA, 1996). Donabedian (1980; 1982 in Wolf en Edgar, 2007) defines a conceptual model of quality of care in relation to structural aspects, processes and outcomes. Structural aspects are relatively stable characteristics, of the tools and recourses available, and of the physical and financial resources. Examples from the homelessness service delivery include the level of and composition of the workforce and the buildings or accommodation. In Donabedian’s view structure is an indirect measure of quality because it increases or decreases the probability of good performance. Insight in the process of care can help determine what factors influence the realization of outcomes, and gives clues for the improvement or adjustment of the contents, the coordination and/or the organization of service delivery. Outcomes are the tangible results of the actions undertaken and pertain to changes in a person’s current and future housing, health and employment status that can be attributed to service delivery. Edgar et al (2003) notice that what is considered to constitute the quality of services is subject to change. What will be included in the concept of quality can be very much dependent upon the location and the context of services.

To solve the risk of relativism performance indicators can be constructed. Lauriks et al (submitted) developed a core set of 30 performance indicators that are feasible given the local information infrastructure, and assess aspects of quality that are meaningful to stakeholders of the public mental health care (PMHC) system in the municipality of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. These indicators are selected from an international inventory. Homeless persons are a subpopulation within the PMHC system, to which five to ten indicators apply. These indicators can be used in measuring the quality of provisions (table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PI description</th>
<th>Numerator</th>
<th>Denominator</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mental health service</td>
<td>#3 homeless persons with a Serious Mental Illness (SMI) that receives</td>
<td># of homeless persons with Serious Mental Illness (SMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coverage homeless</td>
<td>Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) or Intensive Outreach treatment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall service coverage</td>
<td># homeless within the catchment area of the PMHC system that receives</td>
<td># homeless persons within the catchment area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homeless</td>
<td>care from ≥1 providers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved housing</td>
<td># clients that was homeless at intake, whose housing status had</td>
<td># clients that was homeless at intake with a valid second evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>improved in the month (or quarter) preceding the second evaluation at 3,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6, or 12 months after intake. Housing status was ranked (from low to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>best) street → night shelter → temporary housing &lt; 6 months → permanent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>housing &gt; 6 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent housing</td>
<td># clients that was homeless at intake, who lived in permanent</td>
<td># clients that was homeless at intake with a valid second evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>housing in the month (or quarter) preceding the second evaluation at 3,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6, or 12 months after</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless with income</td>
<td># homeless clients that have an income (welfare or paid occupation) in</td>
<td># homeless persons with a valid evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the month (or quarter) preceding the most recent evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Selection on the variable “homeless” within the core set of performance indicators for the local Public Mental Health Care system

3 Ø refers to the number of persons that fit this description
To consider specific tools and techniques clearly leads to analysis at a low and detailed and specific level. In this way I can study the coherence within the menu or arrangement in a particular country or sector, and how and why (Nienke: whether) menus differ in different times and places (cf. Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

Output can be defined as products that are expected to contribute to target attainment (Bakker et al, 2006 in Wolf en Edgar, 2007). Both Donabedian and Lauriks et al. distinguish between process and outcome, since insight in the process can help determine what factors influence the realization of outcomes. What both authors conceptualize as outcomes in their contexts, is what in the framework of this study, I refer to as output.

3.2. **Outcomes**

Outcomes are the perceived benefits to clients or effects in the community (Bakker et al, 2006 in Wolf en Edgar, 2007). Van Gunsteren (2006, in Boutellier, 2011) pleads to focus more on the result of a democratic process than on the chaotic process preceding the outcome. Peter and Pierre (2000) feel that ‘the actual role which the state plays in governance is often the outcome of the tug-of-war between the role the state wants to play and the role which external environment allows it to play’.

In this study outcome is conceptualized as the perceived benefits of the policy to clients, and to the community. This can be studied in terms of client satisfaction and public order and a lack of experienced nuisance by the public.

3.3. **Relation between governance, quality as output and outcomes**

In the preceding descriptions we have come across quite a few causal conceptions (by Hoogerwerf en Herweijer, 2008; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Painter and Peters, 2010; Donabedian, 1983) that have given input to the theoretical model underlying this project. There will be a diminishing certainty or attribution problem in results on the relation between governance and the structural quality of provisions, the output of provisions and the outcome of policy goals. However, it is hard to study reform policy making without assuming that it is a purposeful activity with some shape or pattern to it. Therefore I like to propose that, in resuming the above as based on the current theoretical insights, it is eligible to assume that:

![Basic conceptual model](image-url)

**Certainty of results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance arrangements</th>
<th>++</th>
<th>++</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy model: basic normative and empirical assumptions</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy goals (Benjaminsen et al., 2009)</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy instruments (including accountability mechanisms)</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure: multi-level and relation state, civil society and network design</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management; technical or social; programmatic or explorative.</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output: quality of homeless provisions</strong></td>
<td>Process- and outcome Performance Indicators (Lauriks et al, 2010)</td>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong> Perceived benefits to clients Perceived benefits in the community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other significant independent variable being: the secondary housing market.
Still, there is little empirical evidence for this relation. Homelessness is a wicked problem, and whilst wicked problems traditionally were constructed as problems of spatial planning (e.g. Van Bueren et al, 2003) it has been specific to the delivery of social services and the increasing use of third parties as reference has been made to governance by the hollow state (cf. Milward and Provan, 2000). How elements of policy, structure and process, grouped together within different governance arrangements, impact the quality of provisions and the actual outcomes as perceived by homeless persons and the wider public is unclear. Monitoring does take place, and I would like to relate the outcomes to the governance arrangements and ask myself what differences and similarities exist.

References


Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek (2003). *De opvang verstopt*


