

## A Set of Indicators to Compare Local Governance Arrangements on Homelessness

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### *Abstract*

This article describes a method of comparing new governance arrangements on homelessness by studying three key features: policy, structure and management style. This is done by using a set of indicators that has been developed to measure variations in such arrangements. These indicators are based on an interdisciplinary theoretical framework that was used to assess variations between governance arrangements in three Northern European countries. The framework combines both qualitative and quantitative elements. A triangulation of interviews, documents and observation was used to construct the core data. The comparison and evaluation of different governance approaches provide insight into what elements of governance arrangements are influential in the delivery of homelessness services and how societal results can be improved in general.

### *Summary of the review process*

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Reviewer A (2015-05-27) found this study, which compares the arrangements made for dealing with homelessness in three European municipalities, interesting for applied researchers as well as for professionals who deal with homelessness. The approach to provide qualitative insight in a complicated real life problem is interesting. However, various ambiguities concerning the case selection, the status of variables, what hypotheses are investigated, how the score system for the empirical evidence is grounded and how the assessments have been grounded intersubjectively, have to be removed. The literature concerning what indicators are useful to compare 'Local Governance Arrangements on Homelessness' seems to be well-explored.

Reviewer B (2015-05-21) considered this a potentially thorough and interesting study, but it remains unclear which problem is solved. Furthermore, the organization of the manuscript requires improvement. This reviewer found the manuscript hard to read, due to unnecessary ambiguities and an insufficient organization of the manuscript. He provided a list of these ambiguities and how they could be improved upon. Furthermore, as the author works and lives in Amsterdam, one of the municipalities that were researched, this may have consequences for the author's own position regarding the three cases. The author's involvement with the "Copenhagen" case, for example, has been relatively less direct, since all the information used for this case was derived from translated documents. This and its possible consequences should be mentioned in the discussion.

Based on these reviews, the editor required a revision (2015-05-28). The revision was received on 2015-05-20. The Editor found the comments of the reviewers sufficiently addressed and decided to accept the manuscript for publication (2015-06-25).

## *Introduction*

In Northern Europe the issue of homelessness is largely a local responsibility, offering complex or, according to some commentators, 'wicked' policy challenges. Until recently, local authorities have had limited success in addressing homelessness, due to a lack of information, fragmented services, and so on. In a new attempt to face these challenges, several Northern European metropolises have published similar strategic approaches to end homelessness. This article tries to answer the question of how the efficacy of these new governance arrangements on homelessness in terms of service provision and societal effects can be studied. How can we measure the impact of different administrative-political approaches to homelessness in different Northern European metropolises on the quality of the level of the facilities offered, as well as the related social results? Ultimately, the answer to this question will be helpful in explaining how a difference within the governance arrangement applied in relation to homelessness can account for a difference in the quality of facilities for homeless people and a difference in the social results.

To answer the research questions, an interdisciplinary literature study was first carried out to determine which elements of local governance arrangements to combat homelessness currently exist and which aspects of these elements should be studied. This was done from a socio-medical perspective (i.e. the issue of homelessness) as well as from a governance perspective (i.e. the configuration and quality of outputs and outcomes as the object of study). Three elements of a local governance arrangement appear to be crucial to success: policy, structure, and management.

Within the 'policy' element, three aspects can be distinguished: policy goals, policy instruments, and the basic (moral and empirical) assumptions that underpin the policy (Bressers and Klok, 2008; Benjaminsen et al., 2009, p.1; Fenger and Klok, 2008; Dunn, 2012). With respect to the policy element, on the level of policy objective, little variation is to be expected (Benjaminsen et al., 2009). These authors have found that 'in recent years all European nation states with liberal and social democratic welfare regimes have outlined a set of strategic objectives that aim to, in many cases, eliminate homelessness'. They state that 'a clear emphasis on outcomes such as reducing the use of temporary accommodation, reducing stays in shelters, providing long-term or permanent accommodation and offering individualized services and support are present in all the strategies reviewed' (p.45). Variation in the policy dimension stems from a thorough analysis of the city's instrumentation as well as the basic assumptions underpinning the policy.

The structure element concerns the level at which resources and responsibilities that offer possible solutions to homelessness are allocated (cf. Fleurke and Hulst, 2006; Olsen, 2009, p.16; Bouckaert et al., 2010). In addition, the network structure can be considered an important aspect of the structure element (Bressers, 1993). For this study the variation in the structure element of each city's

(more or less autonomous) position (cf. Fleurke and Hulst, 2006) within the multi-level involvement in homelessness forms a good starting point for the choice of cases preceding the in-depth analysis. This position is expressed by the more or less (de)centralized structure of the governance arrangement. In this respect, within Northern Europe, Scandinavian structures demonstrate the most decentralized approaches. The most centralized arrangements are found in Anglo-Saxon structures. In continental Europe a decentralizing trend is also clearly visible but to a lesser extent than in the Scandinavian structures.

Finally, the management element includes relations that local governments have with non-profit organizations and private organizations within the network structure (Pierre and Peters, 2000). They indicate that administrative traditions range from organic to contractual relationships and from corporatist to more pluralist network structures. Flexible or more distant relationships between politics and the civil service within local government itself are also deemed relevant (Peters and Pierre, 2004). The dominant role of local officials and the value attached to certain conceptions of accountability at the local level can also be distinguished as relevant aspects of management (Painter and Peters, 2010). These authors outline different models or governance arrangements and describe four Western administrative traditions: Anglo-American, Napoleonic, Germanic and Scandinavian.


In doing so, they refer to the Anglo-American model of governance as having a contractual and pluralist relationship with society, a distinct relationship with political institutions, an emphasis on management styles (New Public Management), complex accountability mechanisms and diversity in autonomy at the local level. They characterize Scandinavian governance systems as having a quasi-organic and corporatist relationship with society, a distinct but not incompatible relationship with political institutions, a management style with elements of law, management and organization theory, and as having perhaps the most complex system of accountability and local government which is relatively independent. Continental systems, such as those in Germany and France, according to Painter and Peters, have the clearest organic conception of the state, implying that these systems are the least susceptible to planned change. The relationship between administration and political institutions in these traditions is also characterized as being the closest. The Dutch model is referred to by most theorists (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990; Painter and Peters, 2010) simply as a hybrid case.

In this study, the effectiveness of a governance arrangement forms the first dependent variable. Effectiveness can be assessed on the basis of the quality of the services offered and the related societal effects. The quality of the services offered may be measured by using a number of performance indicators for public mental health care. These performance indicators measure the integrated nature of the services offered, the degree to which this also includes psychiatric services, and the supply of temporary or permanent housing (Lauriks et al., 2010). Efficiency is also

one of the criteria on the basis of which the quality of the services offered may be defined (cf. Fleurke et al., 1997; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Painter and Peters, 2010).

The societal effects of the governance arrangement form the second independent variable of this study. These effects may be assessed on the basis of indicators related to the total number of homeless people in the city (including those residing in hostels and shelters) and the number of people sleeping rough (on the streets). In addition, a picture of the societal effects may be obtained by recording the opinions and reactions of the broader public.

*Figure 1: Theoretical relations between aspects of a local governance arrangement on homelessness and aspects of the arrangement's efficacy*



In the context of this study on the subject of homelessness, three hypotheses on the impact of a governance arrangement on the quality of the services offered and their societal results were put forward. The first hypothesis proposes that specific variations in the way in which a governance arrangement is organized have an impact upon the efficacy of the arrangement in terms of integrated service coverage and customized services (cf. Wolf, 2002; IBO, 2003; Bressers and Klok, 2008; Lauriks et al., 2010). The second hypothesis states that networks that are more heterogenic (i.e. networks in which different kinds of organizations or disciplines are involved) are more effective in the field of housing. Heterogenic networks are more capable of preventing homelessness than homogenic networks are (cf. Pierre and Peters, 2000; Pawson et al., 2007). The third hypothesis argues that, in a more centralized structure (i.e. a structure in which the decision-making powers are highly concentrated in a single organization or discipline), there is greater effectiveness in

terms of efficiency (cf. Fleurke et al., 1997). The theoretical framework, including these three hypotheses, is outlined in Figure 1.

This article focuses specifically on describing the independent variables – the ten elements that are grouped under policy, structure and management. It will show how differences between local governance arrangements can be illustrated and compared successfully.

### *How can we measure variations in governance arrangements on homelessness?*

In order to get to grips with the differences between governance arrangements, it is necessary to examine all relevant theoretical variations and these have been grouped under the 'policy, structure, management' format. This exercise has been very useful in forming tangible entities and questions for the analysis of the data. Posing the question as to what actually seems to matter regarding the outputs and outcomes of governance arrangements on homelessness has resulted in the formation of ordinal quantitative categories with possible scores ranging from zero (0) (indicating that the element as assessed in this particular case has little attributable value to the desired outputs) to two (2) (which means that the case appears to be relatively successful in achieving the desired outputs). In total, nine indicators have been constructed on the basis of the ten elements of governance arrangements. Two elements, the sixth and the seventh, have been combined into one indicator.

*Policy indicators.* Bresser and Klok (2008) have distinguished the setting of internal policy goals from the setting of external policy goals. They found that by setting internal policy goals a city sets a target relating to the situation within the administration itself (such as a lack of integration), while external policy goals are aimed at situations outside the administration. So, the first indicator which is expected to have an impact on the variation in outputs and outcomes concerns the setting of internal goals. The variation in output and outcome per case of the external goals set is studied by making use of separate output indicators and outcome indicators.

Fenger and Klok (2008) have noted how policy instruments are an important means to attain policy goal. For this reason, the second indicator for instrumentation is about the coherence between the setting of policy goals and the likelihood of these goals being attained through the proposed instrumentation. Several authors (cf. Coolsma, 2008; Dunn, 2012) have pointed out the relationship between the basic assumptions within administrations and the chosen policy instrumentation, and it is assumed that a policy model, reflected in instrumentation, will have an impact on the probability of goals being achieved and implemented effectively.

The third indicator, which measures the variation in policy models of a governance arrangement, therefore refers to the number of policy models that are coherent with goals compared to the total number of policy models.

*Structural indicators.* The fourth indicator measures the variation in allocation of responsibilities of a governance arrangement and therefore refers to the number of important policy actors that are involved. Relevant policy actors involved in an integrated homelessness policy approach are the health, housing, income and justice policy sectors.

The fifth indicator measures the allocation of budgets. An assumed effect of the decentralization of means (and responsibilities) can be that this leads to more efficiency. This, however, has been challenged by, for example, Fleurke et al. (1997), who refer to the complexity of a certain policy area and the requirement of a high degree of specialist knowledge, that both impact on the risk of scoring negatively with regard to efficiency of program spending. For this study, it has been proposed that the efficiency of the arrangement on homelessness should be included, which in some cases, will apply to a wider category than just program spending, and will involve the risk to score negative in regard to efficiency as a result of structural elements such as (de-)centeredness as well.

For the sixth indicator, Pawson et al. (2007) have shown that engagement in homelessness prevention by mainstream agencies and service systems plays a critical role in the prevention of homelessness. The focus of this indicator is the probability of partners of the city being mainstream entities. Pierre and Peters (2000) distinguished between network structures that provide more insight into relationships with society, separating pluralist from corporatist and corporatist-pluralist approaches.

*Management indicators.* Relationships between administration and politics have been characterized in different settings as either close or distinct, with politics and society having much or little impact on policies. These, in turn, influence the level of commitment of civil servants and also the level of competence in administration (Painter and Peters, 2010). These authors also pose the question of whether technical (merit) or political criteria dominate in administration and argue that the actual answer might be a realistic balance between commitment and competence. This means that the seventh indicator needs to express the relationship between politics and administration.

The specific role of local civil servants will vary – ranging from being a lawyer and actually being involved in legislating, to merely implementing the law (which has been decided upon by others/politicians), referred to here as the civil servant concept of manager (Painter and Peters, 2010). For this variable, the eighth indicator is operationalized by measuring the number of pages drawn up by local civil servants, compared to available national directives on how to draw up local policy plans.

Finally, the ninth indicator measures the variation in the accountability concepts of a governance arrangement. These will vary between cases. More corporate conceptions are assumed to place greater emphasis on the efficacy of policies (see Table 1).

Table 1 Indicators that measure the variation of a governance arrangement on homelessness

<b>1. INTERNAL POLICY GOALS</b>			
Indicator	The setting of internal policy goals		
Possible variation	By not setting an internal policy goal internal issues risk not being addressed sufficiently (0)	By not setting recent or clear priorities for an internal policy goal internal issues risk not being sufficiently addressed (1)	By setting an internal policy goal internal issues can be addressed (2)
<b>2. TUNED POLICY INSTRUMENTS</b>			
Indicator	The setting of instrumentation tuned to the policy		
Possible variation	A goal that cannot be attained by the available instrumentation (0)	A goal that can be partly attained by the available instrumentation (1)	A goal that is targeted at a subject that has the potential to be influenced by policy-instruments (2)
<b>3. SUPPORTIVE POLICY MODEL</b>			
Indicator	The number of policy models supportive of goals/the total number of policy models		
Possible variation	A problematic policy model hinders policy implementation (0)	A combination of a problematic and supportive policy model influences policy implementation both positively and negatively (1)	A coherent policy model accelerates policy implementation (2)
<b>4. ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES</b>			
Indicator	The degree to which important aligning policy actors are involved in governance arrangements on homelessness		
Possible variation	Little involvement of important policy actors or clarity on mandates, conflicting interests (0)	Average involvement of important policy actors (1)	Close formal involvement and applicable laws create clarity on political stances (2)
<b>5. ALLOCATION OF BUDGETS</b>			
Indicator	The degree to which the allocation of financial responsibilities over the levels of governance enhances the efficient spending of the arrangement		
Possible variation	Decentered: more local discretion. Higher risk of scoring negatively regarding efficiency (0)	Multi-levels of responsibilities and discretion. Risk of scoring negatively regarding efficiency (1)	Centered: less local discretion. Lower risk of scoring negatively regarding efficiency (2)
<b>6. NETWORK/RELATIONS SOCIETY</b>			
Indicator	The degree of the heterogenic nature of the network, indicating more effectiveness in the prevention and recovery of homelessness		
Possible variation	Homogeneous network, corporatist structure, quasi-organic setting, possibly less successful in homelessness prevention (0)	Pluralist-corporatist: many parties much involved, possibly somewhat successful in homelessness prevention (1)	Heterogeneous or pluralist networks in a more contractual setting, possibly most successful in homelessness prevention(2)
<b>7. RELATIONS ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS</b>			
Indicator	The degree to which the relationship between administration and politics is distinct, flexible (close) or somewhere in between, indicating the latter as the most positive relationship		
Possible variation	Embedded policies; close, flexible relationship (1)		A realistic balance between commitment and competence (2)
	Distinct relationship, rigid rules apply (1)		
<b>8. DISCRETION CIVIL SERVANT</b>			
Indicator	The number of prescriptive pages in policy documentation available on different levels of expertise: number of pages local/number of pages national		
Possible variation	Lawyer, much room, relatively little (national) detail (highest = 0)	(medium = 1)	Manager, little room, relatively much (national) detail (lowest = 2)
<b>9. ACCOUNTABILITY</b>			
Indicator	The degree to which more corporate conceptions of accountability are part of the governance arrangement, indicating more focus on the actual efficacy of policies		
Possible variation	High impact on conceptions of accountability from politics and/or society (0)	Corporate-style with a clear focus on the efficacy of policies (2)	

## *Methods*

For this research, it was decided that the most suitable approach would be to examine qualitative data in combination with a smaller amount of quantitative data because this takes into account concrete cases and their complexity. More specifically, this research consisted of a triple case study, which allows for comparison (and for the initial stages of a theoretical generalization). In selecting cases, great effort was made to achieve maximum variation in governance arrangements. This means that the cases are all different with regard to the elements that are assumed to influence the quality of outputs and outcomes, the independent variable (governance arrangement, policy, structure, and management). Table 2 summarizes the variation expected, based on the hypotheses that have been formulated related to the dependent variables (quality of output and outcomes).

*Table 2 Expectations on relevant variables of three Western administrative traditions on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon</b>	<b>Continental</b>
<b>Independent variable</b>			
Homeless policy-goals	Similarity	Similarity	Similarity
Structure: level of local autonomy	Decentered: higher levels of local autonomy	Centered: lower levels of local autonomy	Partly decentered: medium levels of local autonomy
Management: administrative tradition	Quasi-organic and corporatist	Contractual and pluralist	Organic

### *Selection of the cases*

According to this analysis, it was possible to include larger cities from any one of these Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon or Continental contexts in this study. Participation in each case depended on the willingness of each particular city to be involved in this study. No city that was approached refused to participate in this study and all three cities that were selected have been helpful in providing access to all the required data. Other relevant partners and stakeholders such as mental health service providers have also given access to the necessary data.

The cities involved in this study are Copenhagen, Glasgow and Amsterdam. The Copenhagen policy in this study is laid down in twelve documents in Danish. These documents have been translated into English. The structure of these documents is very disciplined, making it possible to perform the analysis in a similarly structured way. Both on paper as well as in conversation, causal reasoning could be detected in the policy documents and in talking to public sector respondents. The empirical basis underlying the Copenhagen policy model could also be detected in this data.



At the time of the study, the Glasgow housing policy did not specifically mention any strategies other than (as was later understood) that the city intended to continue with the implementation of the policy goals already set in 2009-2012. This implementation appears to still be in operation after the formal ending of the strategy it evolved from. At the time of interviewing and writing (2013), it was possible to identify the characteristics of the main instrumentation of the current policy in operation on the basis of such policy documentation, interviews conducted and by closely examining the policy goals set out above.

Arguably, the Glasgow case is not a good representation of the state tradition in Anglo-Saxon cases. After all, Scottish social policy and attitudes to the role of the State are substantially different from those in the rest of the United Kingdom, and indeed most of the remainder of the Anglo-Saxon world, and Glasgow is perhaps one of the more *étatist* parts of Scotland. However, this only shows us the additional theoretical value which the study of another Anglo-Saxon case, such as an English one, would have. That said, the evidence from the Glasgow case appears interesting in its own right, and the Glasgow case possibly represents an example which can be better understood by policy makers in Continental and Scandinavian contexts.

At the time of this study, the city of Amsterdam was nearing the end of an eight-year strategy. For each four-year policy period a separate plan was drawn up by the city (2006–2010 and 2011–2014). The focus of this study is on the second stage of the plan (2011–2014). All the documentation that has been used for the study of this case is public and can be found on Amsterdam websites.

### *Methods of analysis*

Each case has been studied by analyzing policy documents (in one case – the Scandinavian – these were translated), examining outputs and outcomes and interviewing about ten stakeholders. For the document analysis, policy documents and municipal registrations have been studied. All research methods have been based on the ten elements and the nine indicators described above. Inquiries have been made to gather further information about the policy, but also about results on the level of outputs (supply of what services) and with regard to outcomes. For the latter two categories, if necessary, service suppliers' registrations have also been studied.

Notes have been made during the interviews and the interviews have been recorded and literally transcribed. The interviewing of all stakeholders was conducted on a confidential basis. All data has been entered into a database, so that the findings could be described systematically and content analysis could be carried out. To get a good impression of the multitude of levels of allocation of funds and responsibilities – horizontal as well as vertical – involved in the successful implementation of the homelessness strategy, respondents were asked to outline these levels from their professional perspective during the interview.

The interviews and documents have all been coded, with the codes mentioned above, in the data management program ATLAS.ti ([www.atlasti.com](http://www.atlasti.com)). One or more codes denote one of the elements described above (policy, management and structure). For example, if a respondent working for the local authority talks about the basis on which payments to homeless services are made, this would be coded with the code 'accountability mechanisms'. In addition, remarks about adjacent policy sectors such as housing, health, justice or income were coded separately, but under the heading of the overall codes of allocation of responsibilities and budgets. After all the documents and transcripts had been coded, the contents were extracted into text files named after their respective code(s). Examining the content of the extracts in detail was an excellent way to study these variables and their meaning in the context of this specific case study.

To validate the findings of the empirical studies each case description was discussed in detail both with an expert (researcher) from Copenhagen, Glasgow or Amsterdam as well as with one or more stakeholders from the administrative department involved. A workshop was also organized, in June 2013, attended by many of the relevant stakeholders from Copenhagen to discuss intermediate findings. From a methodical viewpoint, the main reason for doing this was the opportunity to check facts.

### *Results: variation in governance arrangements*

This paragraph describes what exactly the variation is between metropolitan governance arrangements with regard to homelessness. The evidence is presented at the end of this section, summarized in three graphs (Figure 2). Table 2 (above) provides an overview of the indicators that measure the variation in interventions within a governance arrangement. Tables 3 to 11 below show how the cases have been assessed on the basis of the empirical evidence on each of the elements.

*Table 3 Variation per case in the internal policy goals of the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>1. INTERNAL POLICY GOALS</b>	Focus: ending complex groups living in the streets	Prevention, through and outflow. Generalist. Setting of internal goals	Provide support, advice, assistance, no priority need, prevention, permanent re-housing, reduce offending. Previously: internal goals
<b>Score</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>

Only Amsterdam has a specific internal policy target for the integrated service coverage of homeless people (Table 3). This integrated service coverage requires the relevant services from within the municipality – initially the municipal health department and also the social benefits department – to offer services in alignment

with external services, such as (temporary) housing and general or psychiatric health services. The Amsterdam internal goal emphasizes the importance which is placed on the guiding role being executed by the city itself. This incentive can also be seen in the Glaswegian case, in which, in the preceding strategy period, internal goals regarding an integrated approach to homelessness had also been set. However, the Glaswegian case has been awarded a lower score than the Amsterdam case in this respect because the Glaswegian goals were set in the previous policy period and therefore risk not being prioritized in the current time frame. The Copenhagen case has shown no sign of an internal policy goal which addresses issues of integration, for example between the homelessness office and the department for work and social benefits.

*Table 4 Variation per case in policy instruments of the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>2. TUNED POLICY INSTRUMENTATION</b>	Relevant instrumentation (HF) proposed but mitigated: not for complex groups. Stopgap measures proposed (no 'stick'). Integrated needs assessment and reference to inter-institutional cooperation	Direct, person-centered, coordination on inflow; assessment procedure, local care networks unprepared; health and security instruments	Detailed guidelines for direct social work, partnership housing
<b>Score</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>

Table 4 shows the setting of instrumentation tuned to the policy goals. The case of Glasgow is the clearest example of a case in which targets (such as providing advice and assistance to prevent statutory homelessness and to solve statutory homelessness) are only set when they can be attained by the city's instrumentation. There is less coherence visible between the goals that have been set in Amsterdam and the instrumentation proposed for them. The city of Amsterdam sets goals in relation to prevention and progression as well as rehabilitation. Local care networks, which were within the same policy, were supposed to be the main method of instrumentation but these were not well prepared for this task. In addition, whilst policy goals were targeted at prevention, through-flow and outflow and sustainable recovery, the municipal strategies to coordinate the person-centered approach were actually more successful at institutionalizing people. These two examples illustrate how the Amsterdam instrumentation is not fully tuned in to the city's policy objectives.

In the Copenhagen case, we have witnessed the setting of a clear target, with a focus on ending a specific situation: complex groups living on the streets. The city's most important and probably most relevant instrumentation is Housing First (HF). However, the city's policy initially seems to exclude complex groups from this instrumentation and alternative instruments are proposed. The instrumentations that

are supposed to solve the issue of complex groups living on the streets have been characterized as stopgap measures, as they do not lead to long-term solutions that take people out of homelessness. As in the Amsterdam case, an integrated needs assessment has also been developed. Furthermore, in its proposed instrumentation, Copenhagen states the aim of jointly managing inter-institutional cooperation and the social care plan which also demonstrates a willingness to address fragmentation of services.

*Table 5 Variation per case in the policy models of a governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>3. SUPPORTIVE POLICY MODEL</b>	(1) Focus on treatment; no double diagnoses (-). (2) Mentality: homeless strong individual lives good life in the streets (-)	(1) Resilience of old image (specialist/ generalist (-). (2) Influx security domain in social relief (-) (3) We can do it (+)	(1) Generalist (+) (2) self-responsibility and (un)deserving poor (-)
<b>Score<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>0 supportive policy models / a total of 2 policy models (0 out of 2 → 0)</b>	<b>1 supportive policy model / a total of 3 policy models (1 out of 3 → 1)</b>	<b>1 supportive policy model / a total of 2 policy models (1 out of 2 → 1)</b>

Table 5 shows the number of policy models supportive of goals as part of the total number of policy models. In Copenhagen, the permissive policy model explains the lack of a 'stick' (Fenger and Klok, 2008). In addition, the disparity in policy models between local and national government concerning addiction influences the effectiveness of this city's policy. In Amsterdam, the increased discourse on security in homelessness policy accounts for the choice of this type of instrumentation (as well as the participation of the police in the municipal network). The focus of the coordinated strategies on the most severe groups in the city is also in line with a policy model that reflects the strength of the old image of homelessness as well as the discourse on security risks. This hinders opportunities to achieve preventive and rehabilitative policy goals. In Glasgow, the policy model that has been referred to as 'the undeserving poor' accounts for instrumentation and exclusion mechanisms that stem from anti-social behavior orders. However, the Glasgow case has also been assessed for its second, generalist policy model which coheres with its policy instrumentation of housing options and the policy's strong focus on prevention.

Table 6 shows the degree to which important aligning policy actors are involved in governance arrangements on homelessness. It has been possible to assess whether important policy actors have responsibility or not through measuring which actors are actually involved.

<sup>1</sup> In the variable on the policy model the indicator expresses the number of supportive policy models. Because the results are mathematical fractions (e.g.  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{2}{2}$ ), the outcome is never more than one. Scores between 0 and 1 have been assessed as one (1), while a score that equals one would indicate that all policy models in this particular case are supportive of the policy and is assessed with a score of two (2).

*Table 6 Variation per case in the allocation of responsibilities in the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>4. ALLOCATION RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	Multi-level governance [archipelago]: seemingly decentered, hardly structural, integrated embedding nor mandates on housing, income, health or justice	Multi-level governance: strong decentralizing intentions, local centralizing response. Police, income and health involved. Housing less so.	Centralized. Housing, income, justice involved. Involvement of health more complex.
<b>Score</b>	<b>Low: all four relations problematic = 0</b>	<b>Medium: three out of four involved = 1</b>	<b>Medium: three out of four involved= 1</b>

In the Copenhagen case, which is seemingly an example of a decentered case, there is hardly any structural integrated embedment nor have mandates been set on the required responsibilities for housing, health or justice to be involved in the arrangement. For this reason, the score allocated is zero. In the Amsterdam case, three (health, justice and income) out of four are involved in the arrangement, for which reason this case has scored one. In the Glasgow case, with a focus on housing, it appears easier to involve the justice and income silos than health, which has therefore also led to a score of one

Amsterdam has been shown to have a policy of aligning state policy sectors with each other whilst confronted with both a highly fragmented and multi-leveled structure. In this respect, the difference between the Scandinavian and the continental cases has been the degree to which the (lack of) integration has become part of the policy approach itself. In the continental case, an internal policy goal was set to address the lack of integration whilst, in the Scandinavian case, the policy domain failed to gain wider or more integrated political support in the first place. In the Anglo-Saxon case, both the national directive to work in partnership as well as the necessity to start from a mixed economy of care seems to have led to the most integrated approach. In addition to the national and the local authorities, in this case health, housing associations and private funding also contribute to the goals of the homelessness policy.

*Table 7 Variation per case in the allocation of budgets in the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>5. ALLOCATION OF BUDGET</b>	Patchwork of financing structures (mean lost during course of strategy)	Multi-levels, local additional prioritizing (protection within the specialist arrangement of a specific budget for homelessness only)	Mixed economy of care, much centralized budget, still interplay of 'corrective mechanisms' decrease local efficiency
<b>Score</b>	<b>Inefficient spending (0)</b>	<b>Inefficient exclusivity (0)</b>	<b>Efficient spending somewhat mitigated (1)</b>

Table 7 displays the degree to which the allocation of financial responsibilities over the levels of governance enhances the efficient spending of the arrangement. Mental health services for the target group in Copenhagen have a patchwork of financing structures, not only stemming from the health sector, but also from the municipality and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. The political reluctance towards a harm reduction approach also impacts forms and management of treatment available for addiction. Mental health is only partly decentralized, possibly only temporarily, and could be allocated to national level. Examples have been presented of inefficient spending as a result of the patchwork of financing structures.

In the continental case, budget exclusivity poses questions of wider municipal efficiency. The administration aims to integrate care for elderly, intellectually handicapped and homeless people to allocate responsibilities in conjunction across each area. For this, strategies of the self-sufficiency matrix and efforts to work with profiles are being implemented, but no fundamental choices have yet been made.

Within the centralized, adversarial and deprived context of the Anglo-Saxon case, its most ambitious social model regarding homelessness (cf. Anderson and Serpa, 2013) has clear limitations. However, the council is not entirely out of the picture and has taken on coordinating tasks. At the same time, and attributable to this management style, innovative initiatives are taken and are visible at other levels (e.g. Scottish government, NHS) and non-governmental local initiatives are also present.

*Table 8 Variation per case in the networks and relations with society of the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>6. NETWORK/ RELATIONS SOCIETY</b>	Corporatist. Archipelago and homogeneous, longstanding relations. Officially sanctioned interest groups involved. Third-sector parties independent and do not always support the policy. Relations with shelter providers, with national administrative level only	Pluralist-corporatist. More homogenic than heterogenic, longstanding relations Effective coordination through involving all institutionalized coalitions, limited focus on housing	Pluralist. More heterogenic, detached (fewer longstanding relations), focus on housing Vital and at times antagonist society More detached relation with shelter providers, investment in relation housing partners
<b>Score</b>	<b>Homogenic, less effective (0)</b>	<b>More homogenic than heterogenic. More effective (1)</b>	<b>Most heterogenic, most effective (2)</b>

The degree of the heterogenic nature of the network, indicating more effectiveness in the prevention and recovery of homelessness is shown in table 8. The concept of the pluralist-corporatist model appears to be very helpful in understanding what constitutes Amsterdam's management or coordination. In addition, the official sanctioning of interest groups by the government, characteristic of a corporatist structure, can indeed be seen in the Copenhagen case. In this particular case, NGOs are actually key players; however, opportunities for the local authority to involve or change these are limited, because of multi-level structures. In

the context of particular influential networks, working in partnership appears to require a lot of argumentation and discussion in practice. Particular influential parties in the network did not always support the policy that was to be implemented, even within their own voluntary organizations. Moreover, these parties tended to have a rather independent position in relation to the local authority, which therefore makes balancing difficult within the (ultimately national) network part of the municipal role. The homogeneous constellation of this particular network has been scored as zero because of a lack of involvement of more mainstream partners, who are expected to contribute to the prevention of homelessness (cf. Pawson, 2007).

We have seen how the most options to work with mainstream partners exist in Glasgow, which provides homelessness services such as the street work team. This aligns with the theoretical assumption about this city council which establishes arenas and gives each group equal chances of winning, in line with the pluralist model (cf. Pierre and Peters, 2000). In the Glaswegian case, we have seen an example of a situation where the market and civil society play a prominent role, and where people rely strongly on various forms of self-organized, voluntary types of governance (cf. Painter and Peters, 2010). For its achievement in involving more mainstream and various other partners in its network, which, according to relevant literature is an indicator of success in homelessness prevention, Glasgow has been assessed with a score of two.

*Table 9 Variation per case in the relationships between administration and politics in the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>7. RELATIONS ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS</b>	Highly flexible relationship between administration and political institutions embedded policies	Relatively informal and interwoven. Political criteria and elements of bureaucracy dominate policy	Rigid rules in relationship to administration and politics, finance and fear that dominate policy, distinct relationship, rigid rules apply
<b>Score</b>	<b>Flexible (1)</b>	<b>Flexible (1)</b>	<b>Distinct (1)</b>

Table 9 shows the degree to which the relationship between administration and politics is distinct (rigid), flexible (close) or somewhere in between, indicating the latter as the most positive relationship. The relationship between administration and politics can be characterized in different settings as either close or distinct, with politics and society having much or little impact on policies. On the basis of the empirical study a rephrasing of these concepts is proposed into rigid, instead of distinct, and flexible, instead of close. Cases vary on these archetypes from most rigid rules applicable to relationships (which was found to be the case in Glasgow, consequently scoring one) to highest flexibility required in the management of relationships (which appeared to be the case in both Amsterdam and Copenhagen, which consequently also scored one).

*Table 10 Variation per case in the discretion of civil servants in the governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>8. DISCRETION CIVIL SERVANT</b>	Lawyer in context with emphasis on political criteria. Danish Strategy to Reduce Homelessness 2009–2012: 20 pgs. Copenhagen policy sheets: 58 pgs. [58/20 = 2,9]	Legislating manager. Amsterdam letter of the Social Support Act (2007): articles 1 and 20: 3 pages. Amsterdam translation of the G4 strategy: 20 pages [20/3 = 6.66]	Manager. Scottish Executive, code of guidance on homelessness (2005): 129 pages; Glasgow Homelessness Strategy 2009-2012: 57 pages [57/129 = 0,44 <sup>2</sup> ]
<b>Score</b>	<b>[medium] 1</b>	<b>[highest] 0</b>	<b>[lowest] 2</b>

Table 10 indicates the number of prescriptive pages in policy documentation available on different levels of expertise: number of pages local/number of pages national. In the Anglo-Saxon case, the lowest level of discretion for the civil servant and the most national direction in terms of local discretion was observed. The result on this variable is expressed by the level of detail of the central documentation, such as the detailed Scottish code of guidance on homelessness, compared to the (required) detail at the local level, where so much clarity about what to do and what not to do is given at this central level. In this case, clear examples have also been given of ‘anti-étatist institutions’ (cf. Painter and Peters, 2010: 21). This expression of distrust towards a politically non-accountable role, such as that of the civil servant, results in the lowest discretion-making capacity to be allocated to this level. Due to both the financial situation and centralized and political decision-making, the room for maneuver for individuals can be very limited when administration is mainly reduced to procedural manners.

An alternative conception has been described in the Scandinavian case, in which much discretionary room is given to civil servants to come up with the best solution for society, This is clearly expected to be embedded within political and societal demands and civil servants are not expected to operate as technocrats. However, in this respect the Scandinavian case appeared to have more clarity in terms of national direction available to the work of the civil servant than the continental case. In the continental case, the room for civil servants to draw up their own plans locally appeared to be the highest.

*Table 11 Variation per case in the conceptions of accountability in a governance arrangement on homelessness*

	<b>Scandinavian (Copenhagen)</b>	<b>Continental (Amsterdam)</b>	<b>Anglo-Saxon (Glasgow)</b>
<b>9. ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	Emphasis on political criteria. Strategy’s strengthened accountability mechanisms function in a less corporate, more noncommittal context	Accountability mechanisms impacted by politics and society	Corporate-style. Law provides clarity on responsibilities
<b>Score</b>	<b>Less corporate (0)</b>	<b>Less corporate (0)</b>	<b>More corporate (2)</b>

<sup>2</sup> Glasgow Housing Strategy 2011-2016: 1 page.



Lastly, table 11 shows the degree to which more corporate conceptions of accountability are part of the governance arrangement, indicating more focus on the actual efficacy of policies. According to theorists, a more contractarian notion of the state, in which state and society are not intertwined and the contract between state and society is limited, is also reflected in the corporate management of these relations. However, as in the Amsterdam and Copenhagen contexts, in the Glaswegian context it also appeared difficult to set outcome targets for shelter provision. During this study, it has also been seen that, when contracts, service specifications and agreements have actually been set up, the administration has limited availability of legal assistance within the administration. This limitation requires priorities to be set on which services receive the majority of attention. In practice the resulting agreements and management will therefore sometimes not differ very much from the Amsterdam model/practice.




### *Conclusions*

The comparison of the three cases on characteristics of their governance arrangements has been summarized within three graphs (see Figure 2). These graphs illustrate each of the three governance arrangements and how they differ in terms of what matters in these arrangements.

For example, it can be seen within the Copenhagen governance graph that there is the least relevant activity within the first quarter, indicating that internal goals or instrumentation tuned to these goals have only been set to a certain degree, nor is any supportive policy model apparent. For the Amsterdam case, more activity is visible within the first quarter of the graph, with the highest level of activity on the setting of internal goals and also some progress on the setting of realistic goals. However, in Amsterdam there appears to be little support between the policy goals and its model. In the Glasgow case some activity can be seen on the setting of internal policy goals. Still, this case displays the most activity in terms of tuned-in instrumentation to the goals and on the provision of support within the policy model.

The proposed set of indicators has proved very useful for comparing governance arrangements on homelessness. For example, it has provided strong evidence for very distinct conceptions of the civil servant, indicating that the likelihood that this variable can explain the variation in efficiency outcomes is high. Another conclusion that can be drawn is that none of the cases has provided evidence of the 'most preferred relationship' (cf. Painter and Peters, 2010) in which there is a realistic balance between a civil servant's commitment and competence. Strong evidence has been found for the idea of 'negotiated conceptions of accountability' (cf. Frederickson and Smith, 2003) in all three cases, which implies that, even though differences can be seen in terms of accountability, this seems to be somewhat mitigated by the specifics of a complex social issue, or 'wicked' social problem. Finally, the comparison of governance arrangements that took place based on the set of

Figure 2. A graphical representation of the differences between the three governance arrangements



indicators forms a solid foundation for the analysis of the relationships between these and the independent variables (the quality of outputs and outcomes).

### *Discussion*

This study makes an important contribution to the academic debate on the optimal organization of governance arrangements. It provides a methodological tool to study a complex social phenomenon such as homelessness from a governance angle. In addition, the results of this research offer some ideas for the development of policies in areas of socially complex issues, such as a strategy on homelessness.

The theoretical implications of these ten indicators to describe governance arrangements on homelessness are far-reaching. However, up until now, these indicators have only been tested once: in the three case studies described here. There is a clear need for this research to be repeated and for the indicators to be tested further. A relatively wide variety of indicators has been presented in this article. Each of the indicators for elements of governance in these three cases appears to have additional value, however, this value varied in each case. More case studies would allow for the strengthening of both the theoretical as well as the methodological models that underpin this study.

It would be relevant and useful in a theoretical sense as well as valid for policy development to apply the indicators of this study and their conceptual model to other cases. On the one hand, studying more cases within the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and particularly the continental models as well as the hybrid configuration of the Netherlands would allow for more generalizations about the theoretical model. On the other hand, the research could also successfully be extended to cases that have a less comparable level of welfare than the cases that have been studied to date. On the basis of visits and a review of policies in southern European cities, such as Lisbon and Athens, it is possible to make this recommendation with confidence. In addition to the Liberal, Corporatist-Statist and Social Democratic models, Esping-Andersen (1990) also identifies a Mediterranean model for Italy, Spain or Greece, where the family network is important for providing welfare. This has implications for the role of the government that would be relevant to study. Finally, it has already been suggested by both health practitioners and administrative managers in the local policy domain of income and social benefits that these indicators could help to analyze differences and similarities in the governance of hospitals or in participation.

There are also possible limitations to the graphs that were used to illustrate the differences among the cities. If these are used as a principal means of analysis, they will require more explanation. However, it appears from presentations so far that these graphs have been much appreciated by practitioners.

Finally, the author works and lives in Amsterdam, which may have implications for the distance the author has in relation to the three cases. It could be argued that possibly the largest distance exists in the Copenhagen case because the information

is the most indirect, since it derives from translated documents. The Copenhagen case appeared to have the least effective governance arrangement of the three cases. However, to avoid the risk of this finding being impacted by the distance perspective of the author, facts have been checked on three separate occasions with Copenhagen respondents as well as with other experts from that city. In the discussion of the final draft, these respondents have confirmed that this text is focused on the right issues in Copenhagen policy. On the basis of the final publication of the research described here, bureaucrats from Scandinavian cities in particular have expressed interest in the findings of this study because they have found that they accurately reflect policy realities in those places.

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